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COMMENTS
COMMUNITY PROPERTY-CIVIL CODE SECTION
4800.8: THE INEQUITABLE RESULTS FROM ITS
APPLICATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Legislature recently enacted a series of statutes
modifying California's community property laws. One such statute is
Civil Code section 4800.8 which provides:
The court shall make whatever orders are necessary or appro-
priate to assure that each party receives his or her full commu-
nity property share in any retirement plan, whether public or
private, including all survivor and death benefits, including, but
not limited to, any of the following:
a) Order the division of any retirement benefits payable
upon or after the death of either party in a manner consistent
with section 4800.
b) Order a party to elect a survivor benefit annuity or other
similar election for the benefit of the other party, as specified by
the court, in any case in which a retirement plan provides for
such an election. .... 1
The effect of this new section is the abolishment of the termina-
ble interest rule2 set forth in Benson v. City of Los Angeles' and
0 1989 by Joanna McKim.
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.8 (West Supp. 1989).
2. Section 2 provides: "It is the intent of the Legislature to abolish the terminable inter-
est rule set forth in Waite v. Waite and Benson v. City of Los Angeles, in order that retire-
ment benefits shall be divided in accordance with Section 4800." CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.8
(West Supp. 1989) [citations omitted].
3. 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963).
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Waite v. Waite.4 Under the rule, an interest in a retirement plan
originating from community funds or community labor constitutes
community property, yet a nonparticipant spouse does not have an
interest in benefits payable after the death of either spouse.5
According to the terminable interest rule, the nonemployee
spouse takes a community share in retirement benefits while the em-
ployee spouse is still living.6 However, the nonemployee spouse may
not alienate or devise those benefits." The employee may designate a
beneficiary, other than the nonemployee spouse, to receive the bene-
fits upon the employee's death,8 or the benefits may go to a subse-
quent spouse who qualifies under the pension plan as the employee's
"survivor" or "widow." 9
The main policy reasons of the terminable interest rule are that:
1) the employer is entitled to certainty concerning his obligations
under the applicable retirement program; 2) the employer must not
be required to do more than is specified by the contract with the
employee spouse; and 3) the employer should not have to be frozen
into contract obligations. °
The effect of this new statute upon California community prop-
erty law is significant. In eliminating the terminable interest rule,
section 4800.8 provides that a former nonemployee spouse may re-
ceive his or her community property share in the retirement benefits
of the employee spouse. Additionally, according to section 4800.8,
the interest of the nonemployee spouse in the benefits extends to ben-
efits payable after the death of either spouse. Yet, in abrogating the
terminable interest rule, section 4800.8 adversely effects the em-
ployee spouse, the nonemployee spouse, and the employer.
First, section 4800.8 can disadvantage the employee spouse if
the nonemployee spouse dies first. For example, if H (the employee
spouse) marries W and W later dies, H can be deprived of a portion
of his retirement benefits if W has previously bequeathed her interest
4. 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972).
5. Chirmside v. Board of Admin., Public Employees' Retirement Sys., 143 Cal. App. 3d
205, 208, 191 Cal. Rptr. 605, 607 (1983). See also Phillipson v. Board of Admin., Public
Employees' Retirement Sys., 3 Cal. 3d 32, 43, 473 P.2d 765, 772, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 68 (1970);
In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 654, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184, 194 (1974).
6. Chirmside, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 208, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
7. Id. (citing Waite, 6 Cal. 3d at 474, 492 P.2d at 22, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 334).
8. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Bruegl, 47 Cal. App. 3d 201, 206, 120 Cal. Rptr. 597,
600 (1975)).
9. Id. (citing Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 360, 384 P.2d 649, 652, 33
Cal. Rptr. 257, 260 (1963)).
10. In re Marriage of Becker, 161 Cal. App. 3d 65, 73, 207 Cal. Rptr. 392, 399 (1984).
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in the benefits to persons other than H.
Additionally, section 4800.8 may disadvantage the nonemployee
spouse. A widowed nonemployee spouse may be deprived of a share
in the benefits of the employee spouse. For example, suppose the
employee spouse (H) has earned community property benefits during
his first marriage and later remarries after divorce. In the event of
H's death, the benefits do not necessarily go back to H so that the
widow receives her share of the benefits. Instead, the first wife may
collect her share in the benefits which will consequently deprive the
widow of perhaps her only means of sustenance.
Third, an application of section 4800.8 may compel an em-
ployer to alter an existing contract in order to pay benefits to persons
(e.g., the nonemployee spouses' devisees) who are not parties to the
contract, who are wholly unrelated to the employee, and therefore of
no concern to the employer.
This comment will assess section 4800.8's impact on community
property in California. First, the comment will examine the termina-
ble interest rule in three phases: its origin," development,12 and de-
mise. 3 Within this framework, the comment will next analyze sec-
tion 4800.8's impact on community property law in California.
Section III will assess the effects of section 4800.8 on the various
parties involved 4 and evaluate the underlying need for the statute."
Finally, Section IV will propose an amendment to section 4800.8
which will mitigate the inequities created by the present statute.' 6
II. HISTORY OF THE TERMINABLE INTEREST RULE
A. Origin of the Benson-Waite Doctrine
1. Packer v. Board of Retirement
Packer v. Board of Retirement 7 illustrates the genesis of the
terminable interest rule. After Packer, many courts developed the
doctrine and expanded upon its application. 8
11. See infra notes 17-47 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 48-74 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 75-117 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 124-27.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 128-39.
17. 35 Cal. 2d 212, 217 P.2d 660 (1950).
18. In re Marriage of Taylor, 189 Cal. App. 3d 435, 438 n.4, 234 Cal. Rptr. 486, 488
n.4 (1987). See generally Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325
(1972); Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257
(1963).
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In Packer, the widow (W) of a retired peace officer (H)
brought an action to compel the Board of Retirement of the Los An-
geles County Peace Officers' Retirement System and the members
thereof to pay her a pension. 9 During this time, the County Peace
Officers Retirement Law was in effect.20 Enacted in 1931, it pro-
vided for a widow's pension if the officer had been disabled in the
line of duty."' In 1937, the law was amended to extend pension
rights to the widow or children of any peace officer who died after
retirement. 2 In 1941, the law was further amended to provide that
an officer might obtain a pension for his widow by exercising an
option to take a lesser pension for himself during his life.2" Accord-
The phrase "terminable interest rule" apparently originated in Theide, The Community
Property Interest of the Non-Employee Spouse in Private Employment Retirement Benefits, 9
U.S.F. L. REV. 635, 638-39 (1975). See also Culhane, Toward Pension Equality: A Reexami-
nation of California's Terminable Interest Doctrine, 14 Sw. U.L. REV. 613, 615 n.5 (1984);
Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefits after
Marriage of Brown and ERISA, 25 UCLA L. REV. 417, 443 n.92 (1978).
19. Packer, 35 Cal. 2d at 213, 217 P.2d at 661.
20. CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 31900-32063 (West 1988) (amending Peace Officers Retire-
ment Law, ch. 268, § 11, CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. act 5848 § 11 (Deering 1931)).
21. Peace Officers Retirement Law, ch. 268, § 11, CAL. GEN LAWS ANN. act 5848, §
11 (Deering 1931) (amended by ch. 303, 1937). See also Packer, 35 Cal. 2d at 213, 217 P.2d
at 661.
22. Peace Officers Retirement Law, ch. 268, § 11, CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. act 5848, §
11 (Deering 1931) (amended by ch. 303, 1937). The 1937 amendment to section 11 of the act
provided that, with certain limitations, the flat sum of $75.00 per month should be paid to the
widow or children of a peace officer who "shall be killed or die, as a result of any injury
received during the performance of his duty, or from sickness caused by the discharge of such
duty, or after retirement, or while eligible to retirement on account of years of service ....
Id. (emphasis added). See also Packer, 35 Cal. 2d at 213, 217 P.2d at 661.
23. Peace Officers Retirement Law, ch. 268, § 11, CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. act 5848, §
11 (Deering 1931) (amended by ch. 745, 1941). The portion of section 11 pertaining to wid-
ows' pensions was amended to read in part:
Whenever any member shall be killed, or die, as a result of any injury received
during the performance of his duty, or from sickness caused by the discharge of
such duty, or after retirement for service connected disability, an annual pen-
sion shall be paid in equal monthly installments to his widow or child or chil-
dren, in an amount equal to one half of such member's terminal salary ....
Id. See also Packer, 35 Cal. 2d at 213 n.2, 217 P.2d at 661 n.2. Section 11.5, enacted in 1941,
reads:
At any time before the first payment on account of any pension is made, or
within 60 days after the effective date of this section, a member or beneficiary
may elect to receive the actuarial equivalent at that time of his pension in a
lesser pension payable throughout his life and that of his widow, if she survives
him, in accordance with one or the other of the following options: Option 1:
Upon his death, such lesser pension shall be continued throughout the life of
and paid to his widow. Option 2: Upon his death, one half of such lesser pen-
sion shall be continued throughout the life of and paid to the widow.
Peace Officers Retirement Law, ch. 745, CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. act 5845, § 11.5 (Deering
1941).
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ingly, all other provisions for a widow's pension were eliminated ex-
cept where the officer died as a result of a service-connected disabil-
ity or was retired for such a cause.24
H retired after serving the number of years required to entitle
him to a pension. It was not claimed that H ever exercised the op-
tion which would have entitled W to a pension. W asserted that H's
service under the 1937 provision gave her, as third party beneficiary,
a separate vested right to a widow's pension which the 1941 amend-
ment destroyed. 5 The court disagreed and stated that a widow's in-
terest, prior to her husband's death, was to be considered merely a
part of his pension benefits.2" As such, the widow's interest was sub-
ject to being entirely eliminated." The court reasoned that to rule
otherwise would remove a significant amount of flexibility necessary
for the operation of pension systems." According to the court, a con-
trary ruling "would mean that provisions benefitting third persons
would be frozen into the law with respect to all employees then in
service.2 9 Thus, these interests could not be removed despite the em-
ployee's consent and his option to receive other pension benefits
which might be of greater value to him than the one sought to be
eliminated.30
2. Benson v. City of Los Angeles
The case of Benson v. City of Los Angeles 1 further explains
the origins of the terminable interest rule. In Benson, appellant Te-
resa Benson (W1) married August Benson (H) in 1920. Between
1916 and 1940, H was employed by the Los Angeles Fire Depart-
ment. During the period of H's employment, portions of his earnings
were withheld in the amount of his contributions for pension benefits
pursuant to provisions in the Los Angeles City Charter. In 1940, H
retired from active service and was accordingly paid regular pension
payments. In 1945, H commenced an action against W1 for divorce.
In 1953, H married Olive (W2) and remained with her until his
death in 1960. After H's death, both wives filed claims with the city
24. Peace Officers Retirement Law, ch. 745, § 11, CAL. GEN. LAws ANN. act 5845, §
11 (Deering 1941). See also Packer, 35 Cal. 2d at 213, 217 P.2d at 661.
25. Packer, 35 Cal. 2d at 215, 217 P.2d at 662.
26. Id. at 216, 217 P.2d at 663.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 217, 217 P.2d at 664.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963) (questioned in In re Mar-
riage of Taylor, 189 Cal. App. 3d 435, 440, 234 Cal. Rptr. 486, 489 (1987)).
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for widow's pension benefits. 2 W1 claimed she had a community
property interest in the benefits." W2 also claimed an interest in the
benefits based on the fact that she was a widow and the Charter
provided for payments to the widows of police or fire department
members. 84
The Supreme Court recognized that at the time of H and Wl's
separation, both parties had a community property interest in the
pension, but "no division of such interest was made."'3 5 However, the
court denied W1 any recovery. 6 According to the court, the "com-
munity possessed only such an interest . . . as [H's] employment
contract provided." '87 Thus, the pension was payable only to the
widow, W2. The court stated:
This is not to say that upon a division of the community estate
she [WI] could not have participated therein. Undoubtedly she
had an interest which she could have asserted in the payments
to August [H] during his lifetime, had she sought to do so. But
after August's death, the only right remaining was to enforce
the city's covenant to make payments to the "widow." 88
Moreover, public policy pointed to such a result. According to
the court, "[T]o vest interests not subject to control by the employee
would impose such inflexibility upon public employment that the
purpose of providing for retirement would be defeated. Such purpose
is to induce competent persons to enter and remain in public
service. ' '81
3. Waite v. Waite
The terminable interest rule was further delineated in Waite v.
Waite.4° In Waite, defendant Russell Waite (H) and plaintiff Jean
32. Benson, 60 Cal. 2d at 358, 384 P.2d at 650, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
33. Id. at 359-60, 384 P.2d at 651, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
34. Id. at 358-59, 384 P.2d at 650-51, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 258-59.
35. Id. at 358, 384 P.2d at 650, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
36. Id. at 362, 384 P.2d at 653, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
37. Id. at 360, 384 P.2d at 651, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
38. Id. at 360, 384 P.2d at 652, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
39. Id. at 361, 384 P.2d at 652, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 260. See also Allen v. City of Long
Beach, 45 Cal. 2d 128, 131, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (1955) (the court supported the modification of
an employee's vested contractual pension rights prior to retirement for purposes of keeping the
pension system flexible); Kern v. City of Long Beach, 29 Cal. 2d 848, 855, 179 P.2d 799, 803,
(1947) (although city employee has a vested contractual right to a pension, the amount, terms,
and conditions of the benefits may be altered).
40. 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972) (overruled by In re Marriage
of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976)).
[Vol. 29
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Waite (W) married in 1934, and separated in 1967. During the
marriage, H served as a Superior Court Judge. Over the years, H
contributed to the Judges' Retirement Fund, all of which was com-
munity property. H retired in 1966 without withdrawing his contri-
butions or electing an optional settlement, and became entitled to a
monthly pension. Upon separating in 1967, H and W divided the
community property and excluded their respective pension rights."1
H then sued for divorce in Nevada in 1967. The Nevada court
awarded H the contributions to the Judges' Retirement Fund, to-
gether with all rights and benefits accruing thereunder."2 W later
filed a divorce action in California. The court ordered the payment
to W, or her devisee or heirs, of one half of all benefits which may
be payable under the Judges' Retirement Act by reason of H's
services.4
H appealed, presenting the court with the issue of whether at
the time of dissolution a judge's retirement benefits could be made
payable to the judges spouse, or to "her devisee or heirs."44 The
court found that the statutory scheme for judges' pensions precluded
W's contention that her legatees should inherit pension payments
payable for the rest of the judge's life.45 As the court explained:
"[T]he state has established here a pension plan in which pension
benefits terminate with the death of the employee, or under optional
programs, with the death of his surviving spouse. . . . The state
contributes no benefits to the employee's estate, his heirs, or his lega-
tees." 46 Crucial to the court's analysis was the state interest. The
court noted:
The state's concern, then, lies in provision for the subsistence of
the employee and his spouse, not in the extension of benefits to
such persons or organizations the spouse may select as the ob-
jects of her bounty. Once the spouse dies, of course, her need for
subsistence ends, and the state's interest in her sustenance
reaches a coincident completion. When this termination occurs,
the state's concern narrows to the sustenance of the retired em-
ployee; its pension payments must necessarily be directed to that
sole objective."'
41. Id. at 465, 492 P.2d at 15, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
42. Id. at 465, 492 P.2d at 15-16, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28.
43. Id. at 466, 492 P.2d at 16, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 474, 492 P.2d at 22, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
46. Id. at 473, 492 P.2d at 21, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
47. Id.
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B. Development of the Terminable Interest Rule
In 1972, the court in Berry v. Board of Retirement of the
County of Los Angeles Retirement Association,48 citing Waite, held
that the community interest of employee's former wife (WI) in em-
ployee's benefits died at the same time that employee's interest
died."' At the time of divorce from WI, employee (H) was not eligi-
ble to retire. H continued in active service for the county until his
death, at which time he had a surviving widow (W2). The court
decided that the only benefits remaining were those belonging to the
surviving spouse (W2) since Wl's community interest in the benefits
died at the same time as did H's.5"
In Bensing v. Bensing,51 the court similarly reinforced the hold-
ing in Waite. In that case, the appellant (the employee) contended
that pension benefits should be considered a mere expectancy not
subject to division as community property since he had not retired
but was just eligible for retirement. 2 The court disagreed with the
appellant's argument and held that pension benefits were community
property subject to division in a divorce court."3 Yet, in dictum, the
court stated that:
The pension here terminates upon husband's death. Also, if the
wife dies before monthly payments to her amount to the actua-
rial 'present value' of the pension, the payments to her cease
and her share is payable to her husband. Her devisees and heirs
are not entitled to the share of the pension she would have re-
ceived if she lived."
Until this point, the court's application of the Benson-Waite
48. 23 Cal. App. 3d 757, 100 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1972).
49. Id. at 759, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
50. Id. at 758-59, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 551. The court also defined community interest:
It is also our opinion, as spelled out in Waite v. Waite ... that the 'community
interest' which was divisible by the divorce court was either the funds on deposit
at the time of divorce, or the retirement benefits payable to Eugene during his
lifetime and after his retirement as those payments became due and payable, or
an actuarial equivalent of the retirement benefits ... based upon the actuarial
expectancy of the lives of Elizabeth and Eugene at the time of retirement. The
'community interest' valuation could not be engrafted into any benefits ulti-
mately payable to a surviving spouse.
Id. (emphasis added).
51. 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1972) (overruled by In re Marriage of
Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 851, 544 P.2d at 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976)).
52. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 892, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 893, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
[Vol. 29
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doctrine had extended to public pension plans. In the case of In re
Marriage of Bruegl,55 the court extended the Benson-Waite doctrine
to private pensions.
In Bruegl, the parties, Evelyn and Herbert, married in 1945. A
carpenter by profession, Herbert belonged to a union with a noncon-
tributory pension fund. The couple separated in 1973. The main is-
sue confronting the appellate court was Herbert's argument that
since he was not eligible for retirement, he could not receive any
benefits until meeting the requirements specified in his pension plan.
Thus, his interest in the pension was just an expectancy and not a
community interest.56 The court rejected this argument and held that
because the pension plan had vested 57 it was community property
subject to division between the spouses. 8
Additionally, however, Evelyn asked the court to consider part
of the pension as a life insurance policy in order to avoid the rule
that the wife's vested rights in her husband's pension plan are lim-
ited to amounts payable to him while he is living.59 In defining Eve-
lyn's interest in guaranteed payment as contingent, the court held
that Evelyn had no community interest in the guaranteed payment
feature of the plan6" insofar as it related to payments due after Her-
55. 47 Cal. App. 3d 201, 120 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1975) (overruled by Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at
851, 544 P.2d at 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
56. Id. at 203-04, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 598. To support his argument, Herbert relied on
Wiliamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 11, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164, 166 (1962) (overruled
by Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 851, 544 P.2d at 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 641. The court in William-
son established the principle that pension rights are not vested where the payments are subject
to conditions which may or may not occur. In this context, the pension is a mere expectancy
not subject to community property division. See also Kent, Pension Funds and Problems
Under California Community Property Laws, 2 STAN. L. REV. 447, 463, 465 (1950) and
French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 778, 112 P.2d 235, 236-37 (1941) (overruled by Brown, 15
Cal. 3d at 841, 544 P.2d at 562, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 634). In French, the court held that the
appellant's right to retirement pay was a mere expectancy because he had not completed the
necessary requirements.
57. The court distinguished vested from unvested as follows:
Herbert is over 45 years of age and has accumulated more than 10 years of
pension credit. There is no way for his pension rights to be reduced or with-
drawn. Herbert has an irrevocable interest in the fund; his rights have vested
• . . if Herbert were to quit his job tomorrow it could be considered a break,
but would not cancel his pension rights.
Bruegl, 47 Cal. App. at 203-04, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 598. See also In re Marriage of Peterson,
41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 649, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184, 189 (1974) (overruled by Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at
851, 544 P.2d at 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635); Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 842, 544 P.2d at 563, 126
Cal. Rptr. at 635 (defining the term "vested" as "a pension right which survives the discharge
or voluntary termination of the employer").
58. Bruegl, 47 Cal. App. 3d at 206, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
59. Id. See also Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d at 654, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
60. The plan provided that upon the death of the employee after retirement, payments
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bert's death." Thus, the court cut off Evelyn's interest in the plan
upon Herbert's death in accordance with the Benson-Waite
rationale.
The policy reasons behind the terminable interest rule were
further brought to light by the court in In re Marriage of Fithian."'
In upholding the applicability of California community property law
to federal military retirement pay (characterizing it as community
property), the court commented on the need for widows to have a
means of sustenance after their husbands' death." The court stated
that it would not be "incongruous for Congress to supply a program
to aid widows who no longer have husbands to provide sustenance,
and omit to do so for ex-wives who can rely on state family law
concepts of support, alimony, and community property as a source of
income.""" Thus, in addition to concern for employers who should
not have to be frozen into their contracts, and who should not have
to continue payments to persons other than the employee's immedi-
ate family upon that employee's death, concern for the employee's
widow emerged as an articulated policy goal underlying the termina-
ble interest rule.
The cases of In re Marriage of Lionberger" and Allen v. Al-
len6 further solidify the California court's adherence to the termina-
ble interest rule. In Lionberger, husband and wife married in 1953
and separated in 1973. W filed a petition for dissolution of marriage,
and in 1978, the court entered an interlocutory judgment of dissolu-
tion dividing all community property with the exception of H's re-
tirement and pension benefits." The decree additionally provided
that W's interest was alienable, inheritable, and assignable in the
same manner as H's interest in the retirement or pension plan. 68
would be made to the employee's designated beneficiary. The court reasoned that Evelyn's
interest was contingent since the identity of the beneficiary and whether that person survived
would not be known until Herbert's death. Bruegl, 47 Cal. App. 3d at 205-06, 120 Cal. Rptr.
at 600.
61. Id. at 206, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
62. 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974) (overruled by In re Mar-
riage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976)).
63. Id. at 600, 517 P.2d at 454, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
64. id.
65. 97 Cal. App. 3d 56, 158 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1979) (criticized by Chirmside v. Board of
Admin., Public Employees' Retirement Sys., 143 Cal. App. 3d 205, 210, 191 Cal. Rptr. 605,
608 (1983) and questioned by Bowman v. Bowman, 171 Cal. App. 3d 148, 154, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 174, 177 (1985)).
66. 108 Cal. App. 3d 614, 166 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1980).
67. Lionberger, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 59, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
68. Id. at 71, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
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The court, however, following Waite, held that W did not have a
right nor interest in any sums payable after H's death."9
Similar to the Lionberger court, the court in Allen terminated
the interest of a nonemployee spouse in benefits payable after the
employee spouse's death."0
In Allen, husband and wife were married for 36 years when W
died. By then, H had retired from his job with Pan American World
Airways and was receiving retirement income from Pan American.
The retirement plan provided that all benefits received were nonas-
signable, inalienable, and nontransferable, and expressly declared its
purposes to be: 1) to induce employees to enter and continue in em-
ployment with Pan American, and 2) to provide sufficient subsis-
tence for retired employees and their dependents. 1 Yet, W died tes-
tate and made H her sole devisee and legatee. Thus, H believed that
his status as W's devisee and legatee would enable him to circumvent
the inheritance taxes regarding the pension. By not listing the pen-
sion as a community asset, no inheritance taxes would be assessed on
it pursuant to the Revenue and Taxation Code section 13551.2
The court, however, disagreed with H and held that W had no
power to bequeath her interest in the pension funds. 3 In so ruling,
the court provided additional support for the terminable interest
rule. In surveying the terminable interest rule, the court remarked:
Moreover, the result in Waite not only created little inequality;
it was clearly powered by its own consideration of fairness. The
court in Waite focused on the special purpose of the pension at
issue there: "provision for the subsistence of the employee and
his spouse." . . . The court thus highlighted the unique place of
such a pension in community property law; it is property that is
meant to be shared by the spouses and only the spouses, and one
whose purpose would be wholly defeated by allowing the de-
ceased spouse to bequeath his or her share to third per-
sons. . . . It seems perfectly appropriate to the function of pen-
sion benefits that they automatically pass to the surviving
spouse.7 '
69. Id. at 71, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
70. Allen, 108 Cal. App. 3d at 621, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
71. Id. at 616, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 654.
72. The Revenue and Taxation Code section 13551 allowed the taxation of the passage
of a deceased spouse's interest in community property to his or her surviving spouse. Mr. Allen
did not list his pension as a community asset hoping to circumvent the taxation. Id. at 616-17,
166 Cal. Rptr. at 654.
73. Id. at 621, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
74. Id. at 619, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
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C. The Development of Authority in Opposition to the Terminable
Interest Rule
Despite its frequent application, the terminable interest rule
often evoked criticism from the California courts. In Cheney v. City
and County of San Francisco75 Thomas Cheney and his wife en-
tered into an agreement on their wedding day which provided that
their individual earnings would remain separate property after mar-
riage.7 6 Subsequently, Thomas filed for a divorce and after the inter-
locutory decree was entered, he died. Upon his death, a death benefit
from the employees retirement fund became payable and resulted in
being the subject of dispute between Thomas' mother (M) and
Thomas' wife (W). M had been named as a beneficiary by Thomas
pursuant to the retirement plan and contended that since she was the
beneficiary, she should be entitled to the pension." However, W was
the surviving widow and argued that she was entitled to the benefits
because they were community property. 8
The court in Cheney awarded M the pension due to the fact
that there was a valid contract in force between Thomas and W
making the fund Thomas' separate property.79 Yet, the court stated
that notwithstanding the contract's validity, the amount payable from
the employees retirement system was community property.8" In this
instance, the court's position was clearly contrary to the Benson-
Waite approach to post-death benefits under a pension, which treats
the pension as the employee's separate property.
In Shaw v. Board of Administration8 death benefits were also
at issue. Petitioner (the nonemployee spouse) and Frank Shaw (the
employee) were married in 1923. In 1944, Frank became a member
of the State Employees Retirement System and according to the plan,
Frank named Petitioner as beneficiary of any benefits to become due
75. 7 Cal. 2d 565, 61 P.2d 754 (1936). Cheney was harmonized with similar cases in
Gettman v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 866, 197 P.2d
817, 819 (1948).
76. Cheney, 7 Cal. 2d at 567, 61 P.2d at 755.
77. Id. at 567-68, 61 P.2d at 755.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 569, 61 P.2d at 756.
80. Id. The court stated: "We are perforce committed to the view that the amount paya-
ble from the employees retirement system upon the husband's death represented earnings. As
such it was community property unless the agreement executed by the husband and wife pro-
viding otherwise was still in force." Id.
81. 109 Cal. App. 2d 770, 241 P.2d 635 (1952) (disapproved on other grounds in
Watenpaugh v. State Teachers' Retirement, 51 Cal. 2d 675, 681-82, 336 P.2d 165, 169




upon his death. In 1948, Petitioner was granted an interlocutory de-
cree of divorce from Shaw. The issue presented on appeal was
whether or not Petitioner's rights, as designated beneficiary of the
death benefits, were abrogated by the divorce decree.8" On this point,
the court held that Petitioner's rights were not abrogated.8"
However, in dicta, the court's opinion in Shaw was inconsistent
with the terminable interest rule. It suggested that if Petitioner had
not settled her community property claim at divorce, she might have
been able to claim a share of death benefits had Frank named one,
other than herself, as beneficiary. 4 This reasoning contrasts with the
rationale underlying the terminable interest rule which would render
Petitioner's interest in Shaw's death benefits terminated upon his
death. Thus, Petitioner could not have claimed an interest in the
pension after Frank's death.
In Gallaher v. State Teachers' Retirement System,85 the court
further eroded the rationale underlying the terminable interest rule.
In Gallaher, Harold became a member of the teachers' retirement
system in 1950, and under the plan designated his wife Wilma (WI)
as beneficiary. Harold and W1 lived in California until Harold
moved to Reno, Nevada, informing W1 that he intended to obtain a
divorce in Nevada. Thereafter, Harold was awarded a default di-
vorce decree in the Nevada action, and then married Elsie (W2). In
1960, W1 commenced a California divorce action against Harold.
The California decree held the Nevada decree void and provided for
the division of the couple's community property.8 After Harold died,
the issue was whether W1 or W2 would partake in Harold's benefits
from the teachers retirement system. The court upheld Wl's claim
as beneficiary over W2's claim that Harold intended to switch Wl's
status as beneficiary to W2.87 Thus, contrary to the terminable inter-
est rule, Wl's interest in the benefits after Harold's death did not
terminate. Instead, W1 received the benefits and W2 was deprived of
82. Shaw, 109 Cal. App. 2d at 772, 241 P.2d at 636.
83. Id. at 777, 241 P.2d at 639.
84. The court stated:
The extent of the [divorce] decree in this respect ... is that petitioner lost any
claim to a community interest in the amount theretofore paid to the system. If
petitioner lost all community interest in the amount theretofore paid to the sys-
tem by Shaw, it means no more than that her right to demand a proportionate
share of the death benefit, regardless of who might be the beneficiary, was lost.
Id. at 775-76, 241 P.2d at 638.
85. 237 Cal. App. 2d 510, 47 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1965).
86. Id. at 511-12, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
87. Id. at 518, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. The court found no evidence from the record
that Harold performed any affirmative act in furtherance of such intent.
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what would have been her rightful interest in the benefits under the
rule.
In the case of In re Marriage of Peterson,"8 the court openly
disapproved of the terminable interest rule. 9 In Peterson, Petitioner
(W) and Respondent (H) married, then separated, with W filing for
divorce. At the time of the interlocutory order, H was not yet eligible
to retire under the United States Civil Service Retirement System.
The relevant issue on appeal was whether or not W had an interest
in the pension rights if H predeceased her.9 The court rejected her
contention on the basis that prior California Supreme Court cases
were binding and held to the contrary.91 Additionally, the court ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the holding: "We do not believe the rule
which we must follow is fair. Roy's pension rights constitute a bun-
dle to which Elizabeth, as partner in the community during the
years of marriage contributed her equal share. Why should she be
deprived of her right to any single stick in the bundle?"9
In 1983, the court further undercut the terminable interest rule
in Chirmside v. Board of Administration of the Public Employees'
Retirement System.9" In Chirmside, William and Irene Chirmside
married in 1941. In 1946, William began working for the City
Water Department and subsequently became a member of the Pub-
lic Employees Retirement System (PERS). In 1975, William and
Irene divorced, and on the final decree the pension was left unmen-
tioned. 4 In 1977, William retired and under the Retirement System
opted to receive monthly payments and designated his sister as the
beneficiary. William died in 1980, and the issue confronting the
court was whether appellant's (Irene) community property interest
88. 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974) (overruled by In re Marriage of
Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976)).
89. Id. at 656, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 194. (The court stated: "We do not believe the rule
which we must follow is fair.").
90. Id. at 644-46, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
91. Id. at 656, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 194. The court stated:
[W]e are bound to hold that Elizabeth's entitlement in this case is limited to
Roy's pension rights while he is still living, and that she has no 'vested' interest
in any amounts payable after his death, even though these amounts are part of
the pension package purchased with community funds.
Id. (citing Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257
(1963); Phillipson v. Board of Admin., 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970))
(overruled by Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 851, 544 P.2d at 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 641). See also
Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972); and In re Marriage of
Wilson, 10 Cal. 3d 851, 519 P.2d 165, 112 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1974).
92. Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d at 656, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
93. 143 Cal. App. 3d 205, 191 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1983).
94. Id. at 207, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 605-06.
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in her former husband's PERS account terminated with his death.95
The court in Chirmside held that appellant's interest in the
pension did not terminate upon William's death.9 According to the
court, the nonemployee's community property interest in the accu-
mulated contributions could be harmonized with the employee's
power to name a beneficiary by "limiting the employee's power to
his community property interest in the remaining contributions."9
The court based its ruling on the decisions of In re Marriage of
Brown" and Henn v. Henn," and the difference between William's
accumulated contributions and the type of pension or death benefits
addressed in the Benson-Waite line of cases. William's contributions
represented only withheld earnings during marriage and "[t]his
money was unquestionably community property."100
Bowman v. Bowman"'0 marked the court's open retreat from
the terminable interest rule's application. In Bowman, Rudy (H)
and Celia (W1) married in 1949. H was employed by Pan American
World Airways in 1956, until his death in 1981. In 1968, H and
W1 separated and thereafter divorced. The interlocutory divorce
judgment did not mention H's pension plans or life insurance. 0 2 H
then remarried W2, but that marriage also ended. H subsequently
married W3. °8 The subject of dispute involved W1 and W3's re-
95. Id. at 207-08, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
96. Id. at 211, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
97. Id. at 212, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 610. The court further explained that this result would
eliminate possible unfairness that might otherwise occur. According to the court: "In this way,
each statute is given effect, and the unfairness perceived by Justice Kaus in Peterson can be
avoided." Id. See supra text accompanying note 92.
98. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). The court in Brown
described "vested" as "defining a pension right which survives the discharge or voluntary ter-
mination of the employee." Id. at 842, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
99. 26 Cal. 3d 323, 605 P.2d 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1980). The Henn court deter-
mined that a community asset left unmentioned in the pleadings as community property and
left unadjudicated by the divorce decree is subject to future litigation. The court in Chirmside
relied on both the Brown and Henn cases to support the argument that the terminable interest
doctrine has become "legally extinct." Chirmside, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 211, 191 Cal. Rptr. at
608.
100. Id. at 211, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 609. The court stated that: "None of the cases in
which the terminable interest doctrine has been applied involved only the accumulated contri-
butions of the employee spouse." Id. at 209, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 607 (emphasis in original).
Additionally, the court referred to California Civil Code section 687 which provides the defini-
tion of community property: "Community property is property acquired by htlsband and wife,
or either, during marriage, when not acquired as the separate property of either." CAL. CIv.
CODE § 687 (West 1989).
101. 171 Cal. App. 3d 148, 217 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1985) (questioned in Estate of Logan,
191 Cal. App. 3d 319, 325, 236 Cal. Rptr. 368, 371 (1987)).
102. Id. at 151, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
103. Id. at 151, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 175-76.
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spective rights to the pension where H left everything to W3. W1
filed suit, asserting that she could claim a portion of the proceeds
from the pension and life insurance because these benefits were not
divided at the time of their divorce.20 4
The court agreed with W1 and held that respecting the pension
plan, the terminable interest rule was inapplicable.'0 5 The court rea-
soned that the pension benefits were community property and be-
cause they were not divided upon H and Wl's divorce, they still
existed. Therefore, W1 had "a right to her day in court to determine
the amount of her interest."' '
Bowman was most recently followed in In re Marriage of Al-
lison.'0 7 In Allison, husband and wife were married for twenty-
seven years before separating. During the marriage, H was em-
ployed with Pacific Telephone. After the dissolution judgment, but
before the property division, H retired. The Retirement Plan pro-
vided that H could select either a life annuity or a survivor annuity,
and H chose a life annuity.'0 8
The relevant issue confronting the appellate court was whether
W had a community property interest in a survivor annuity. H ar-
gued that W had no interest because such rights were extinguished
by the terminable interest rule.'09 The court, agreeing with the
court's reasoning in Bowman, concluded that survivorship benefits of
a private pension plan were a community asset and may be divided
accordingly." 0 Thus, apparently unconstrained by Benson and its
progeny, the court stated: "We see no interest then that would be
served by the application of the terminable interest rule to this
104. Id. at 151, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
105. Id. at 156, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 179. The court stated:
Rudy was not a public employee and the plan is not a public plan. Unlike
Benson and its progeny, the plan was not restrictive in its choice of benefi-
ciaries. And Celia is not attempting to alienate or assign her interest prior to its
maturity. She is simply seeking what is hers.
Id. Regarding the insurance policy, the court similarly held that Celia was entitled to her
community interest in the life insurance proceeds. Id. at 160, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
106. Id. at 156, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
107. 189 Cal. App. 3d 849, 234 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1987).
108. Id. at 852, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 672. Under the retirement plan, the life annuity
would terminate on H's death. Thereafter, H's surviving spouse would receive payments from
the survivor annuity. Id.
109. Id. at 854, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
110. Id. at 854, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 675. The court cited Bowman: "We see no purpose to
be served in extending this rationale to cut off the nonemployee spouse's community property
rights in private, i.e., nongovernmental pensions." Bowman, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 155, 217
Cal. Rptr. at 178 (citing Culhane, Terminable Interest Doctrine, 14 Sw. U.L. REv. 613, 643




In 1987, the Legislature memorialized the death of the termina-
ble interest rule with the promulgation of section 4800.8. In re
Marriage of Taylor... is the first case to apply section 4800.8. In
Taylor, husband and wife married in 1948 and separated in 1976. H
began working as a Superior Court Judge in 1963 and held that
position until he retired in 1984. H became eligible to retire in May
1983. In October of the same year, W brought suit seeking her pro-
portionate share of benefits that H would have received had he re-
tired when he was initially eligible." 3 The pertinent issue on appeal
was the validity of the terminable interest rule as it had been applied
under the Judges' Retirement Act.""
In applying section 4800.8, the court held that W was entitled
to her share in H's judicial retirement benefits." 5 Also, the court
found that on remand the trial court should make whatever orders
were necessary and appropriate to assure that each party received his
or her full community property share in the retirement plan pursu-
ant to section 4800.8. " 6 In so holding, the terminable interest rule
was finally extinguished." 7
III. AN ANALYSIS OF SECTION 4800.8's IMPACT ON
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN CALIFORNIA
Section 4800.8 reflects the California Legislature's response to
the dissatisfaction generated from the effects of the terminable inter-
est rule. However, the statute exceeds the actual need for which it
was enacted, and consequently does not effectively mitigate the ineq-
uities resulting from the terminable interest rule's application. The
111. Allison, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 855, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
112. 189 Cal. App. 3d 435, 234 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1987) (certified for partial publication).
113. Id. at 437, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
114. Id. at 437-38, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87.
115. Id. at 443, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
116. Id. The court additionally commented that: "[Tlhe law prior to the enactment of
section 4800.8 can be viewed as unfair and as preserving an injustice." Id. at 442, 234 Cal.
Rptr. at 491.
117. Section 4800.8 was later referred to in the case of In re Marriage of Higinbotham,
203 Cal. App. 3d 322, 249 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1988). In Higinbotham, the relevant issue con-
fronting the court was whether or not the wife was entitled to an order, authorized by section
4800.8, directing her husband's retirement plan to pay her a suitable share of any survivor or
death benefits which became payable during her lifetime. Id. at 334, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
The court decided that section 4800.8 should apply. Id. at 335, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 805. In so
ruling, the court retroactively applied section 4800.8. According to the court, the delay in
formal entry of judgment in this case did not justify depriving the non-participant spouse of
her rights under section 4800.8. Id. at 335, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
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following analysis will accordingly describe the adverse effects of the
statute's application on some of the parties involved and the underly-
ing need for the statute.
A. The Effects of Section 4800.8 on the Various Parties Involved
In order to examine the effects of section 4800.8's application
on the employee spouse, the nonemployee surviving spouse, the non-
employee former spouse, and the employer, it is instructive to illus-
trate the two situations which accurately reflect these effects. The
first hypothetical represents a Benson situation, and the second hy-
pothetical shows a Waite situation. The difference between the two
situations is the following: In Benson, the employee spouse prede-
ceases both the nonemployee surviving spouse and the nonemployee
former spouse, so that the issue is whether the former nonemployee
spouse may claim an interest in the widow's pension. In Waite, how-
ever, it is the nonemployee spouse who dies first and the issue is
whether that spouse may bequeath her interest in the pension to de-
feat the claim of the surviving spouse to that interest:
Hypothetical I: H marries W1 in 1920. Between 1916 and 1940,
H is employed by the Fire Department. During this period, a
portion of his earnings are withheld in the amount of his contri-
butions for pension benefits pursuant to the City Charter. In
1940, H retires and begins receiving regular pension payments.
In 1945, H divorces W1. In 1953, H marries W2. In 1960, H
dies and both W1 and W2 file claims with the city for pension
benefits." "
In this case, section 4800.8 would operate to permit W1 to re-
ceive her community share in the pension. Contrary to the result
mandated by an application of the terminable interest rule, Wl's in-
terest in the pension is not extinguished upon H's death.119
This application of section 4800.8 yields both equitable and in-
equitable results. In one sense, by not eliminating Wl's interest in
the pension upon H's death, section 4800.8's application invokes an
equitable consequence because it enables W1 to claim what is right-
fully hers. What H earned while married to W1 is the marital prop-
erty of H and W1, not of H and W2. If W2 was able to claim Wl's
community share in the pension, W1 would be deprived of what, in
essence, is her property.
On the other hand, section 4800.8's application may disadvan-
118. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
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tage W2. First, given the situation where WI receives other means of
support (e.g., financial support from her new husband if she has
remarried), WI may not need the benefits as much as the surviving
widow, W2, who no longer has a husband to provide support and
clearly is in need of the benefits.120 In this way, W2 is deprived of a
needed means of support, while W1 collects an additional source of
income which she most likely does not need.
In spite of this effect, however, it is the author's contention that
section 4800.8's application in a Benson context is justified. In all
fairness, and in accordance with the basic community property prin-
ciple that spouses are joint owners of marital property, W2 should
not be able to claim an interest in benefits which are the community
property of W1 and H. Furthermore, in reference to the possibility
of W2 becoming disadvantaged by the application of section 4800.8,
it is not likely that in this context W2 would be severely affected. In
all likelihood, W2 will have other means of support (e.g., her com-
munity interest in the* benefits) after the death of the employee
spouse.
Nevertheless, as the following hypothetical illustrates, section
4800.8's application is not justified in a Waite situation:
Hypothetical II: H and W marry in 1934 and are divorced in
1967. During the marriage, H serves as Superior Court Judge
and contributes to the Judge's Retirement Fund. In 1966, H
retires without withdrawing his contributions or electing an op-
tional settlement, and becomes entitled to a monthly pension. W
dies testate in 1968, having designated her sister as the devisee
of W's interest in the pension. Both H and W's devisee claim
W's interest in the pension." 1
In this situation, an application of section 4800.8 upholds the
sister's claim to W's interest in the pension. Contrary to the result
compelled by an application of the terminable interest rule, W's in-
terest in the pension is not extinguished upon her death. Thus, W
may bequeath her interest in the pension. Just as in the situation
where the employee spouse predeceases the nonemployee spouse, sec-
tion 4800.8's application in this case may also lead to inequities.
First, as the surviving spouse, H may be adversely affected.
Upon W's death, W's devisee would receive a portion of the pension
and thus deprive H of part of his retirement pay. Furthermore, these
benefits could be H's only means of sustenance when he retires.
120. See supra text accompanying note 64.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
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Therefore, it seems unjust to allow W's heir to receive part of the
benefits of H's labor when H is in need of the benefits himself.
Moreover, if H has not yet retired, it appears even more unfair
to permit W's devisee to begin receiving H's retirement pay when H
is not yet eligible to receive the benefits. In this context, W's devisee
would receive H's retirement pay while H receives nothing.
122
Second, the employer may be adversely affected. Section 4800.8
may compel the employer to modify an existing contract in order to
accommodate W's right to transfer her interest in the benefits. The
employer, consequently, may be forced to make payments to a person
who is not a party to the contract, and therefore is of no concern to
him. As the court stated in Waite:
The state's concern, then, lies in provision for the subsistence of
the employee and his spouse, not in the extension of benefits to
such persons or organizations the spouse may select as the ob-
jects of her bounty.1 28
B. The Need for Section 4800.8
By enacting section 4800.8, the California Legislature sought to
eliminate both the Benson and Waite prongs of the terminable inter-
est rule. However, as the following discussion demonstrates, the Leg-
islature need not have abrogated both prongs of the rule. Specifically,
the California Legislature should have eliminated only the Benson
part of the terminable interest rule.
In analyzing the various cases which illustrate the courts' dis-
satisfaction with the terminable interest rule, a similar fact pattern
emerges. Beginning with Cheney, the cases generally reflect a Benson
situation (upon the death of the employee spouse, the former nonem-
ployee spouse claims a community share of the employee spouse's
pension as against the claim of the widow to the entire pension) 2 as
opposed to a Waite situation (upon the death of the nonemployee
spouse, the employee spouse claims the interest in the pension that
the nonemployee spouse bequeathed to her heirs).125 Therefore, the
122. Furthermore, this result runs counter to the basiccommunity property notion that
spouses are joint owners of marital property. By allowing the deceased spouse to bequeath his
or her share to third persons, section 4800.8 seemingly characterizes these benefits as the de-
ceased spouses' separate property. See supra text accompanying note 74.
123. Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 473, 492 P.2d 13, 21, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325, 333
(1972).
124. See Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 357-58, 384 P.2d 649, 650, 33
Cal. Rptr. 257, 258 (1963).
125. See Waite, 6 Cal. 3d at 473, 492 P.2d at 21, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 333. The cases of
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real purpose of section 4800.8 is to resolve the inequitable results
from the terminable interest rule's application in a Benson
situation."2
Seen in this light, the application of section 4800.8 is unneces-
sary in a Waite situation. Unlike the holding in Benson, Waite's
holding has not been criticized in many subsequent cases. Most
likely, this is because the terminable interest rule's application in a
Waite situation renders a fair result. It is more equitable to allow the
employee spouse to receive his or her non-employee spouse's commu-
nity share of the benefits upon the non-employee spouse's death
rather than to allow the nonemployee spouse to bequeath the benefits
to persons other than the employee spouse. The nonemployee spouse,
in a sense, is not deprived of anything while he or she is living. The
only restriction imposed on that spouse is his or her right to transfer
the benefits. When weighed against the employee's right to benefits
earned by his or her labor, the nonemployee spouse's right to trans-
fer is significantly less compelling.
Thus, one infers that the need for section 4800.8 does not en-
compass its application in a Waite situation. Therefore, if an amend-
ment were enacted which precluded section 4800.8's application in a
Waite situation, the corresponding inequities produced by such ap-
plication 27 would be eliminated, and the need for the statute would
still be fulfilled.
IV. AMENDMENT OF SECTION 4800.8
Because section 4800.8 is necessary only in a Benson situation,
and would produce unjustified and inequitable results if applied in a
Waite situation, the Legislature should enact an amendment to en-
sure section 4800.8's application in only a Benson situation. Wiscon-
sin's Marital Property Act'2 8 provides a guide as to possible lan-
Benson, Berry, Bruegl, Fithian, Lionberger, Gallaher, Peterson, Chirmside, Bowman and Al-
lison reveal, or hypothesize, a situation where the employee spouse pre-deceases the nonem-
ployee spouse and the community interest of the nonemployee former spouse is at issue. See
supra text accompanying notes 31-39, 48-50, 55-61, 62-64, 65-69, 85-87, 88-92, 93-100, 101-
106, 107-111, respectively, for a discussion and citations of the above listed cases. Only in the
cases of Waite, Bensing and Allen, is there reflected a situation where the nonemployee spouse
predeceases the employee spouse and the issue is whether the nonemployee spouse's interest
reverts to the employee spouse. See supra text accompanying notes 40-47, 51-54, and 70-74,
respectively, for a discussion and citations of the Waite, Bensing, and Allen cases.
126. For example, where the former nonemployee spouse is deprived of her community
share in her former spouse's retirement benefits. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
128. WiS. STAT. ANN § 766.62 (West Supp. 1988) (the Wisconsin Marital Property
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guage of the amendment.
The Act retains the Waite prong of the terminable interest
rule."2 9 Section 5 of the Act states: "The marital property interest of
the nonemployee spouse in a deferred employment benefit plan ter-
minates at the death of the nonemployee spouse if he or she prede-
ceases the employee spouse. '"18 According to the Act, then, the non-
employee spouse's heirs can have a survivorship interest in marital
property only if the nonemployee spouse outlives the employment. " '
When the nonemployee spouse predeceases the employee spouse, the
marital property interest of the nonemployee spouse terminates. This
is in conformity with the terminable interest rule." " In partially re-
taining this rule, the Act precludes the possibility of the predeceasing
nonemployee spouse devising a portion of the surviving employee
spouse's retirement.1 83
Nevertheless, the Act still seems to abrogate the Benson part of
the terminable interest rule. " Consequently, given the situation
where the employee spouse predeceases the nonemployee spouse, an
application of the Act would permit the former nonemployee spouse
to receive his or her community share of the employee spouse's
benefits.
Thus, the incorporation of the Wisconsin's Marital Property
Act into section 4800.8 as an amendment would produce the needed
modification. The application of section 4800.8 would no longer re-
sult in the employee spouse being stripped of retirement benefits
upon the death of the nonemployee spouse. Additionally, the statute
would be applied only in situations where its application is truly
necessary. In this way, the underlying need for the statute would not
be compromised.
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USF-
SPA) "' provides further guidance for an amendment to section
4800.8 that would retain the Waite prong of the terminable interest
Act, effective January 1, 1986, is embodied in section 766.62).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Brauer, The Impact of the Marital Property Act on Deferred Employment Benefits,
Wis. B. BULL., July 1984, 35, 36.
132. Weisberger & Wilcox, A Brief Overview: The New Wisconsin Marital Property
Act, Wis. B. BULL., July 1984, 10, 13 (hereinafter A Brief Overview]. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 40-47.
133. A Brief Overview, supra note 132, at 13.
134. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 4766.62 (West Supp. 1988).
135. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(2) (1982). In 1982, Congress enacted the Federal Uniform
Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA). Id.
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rule. Under the USFSPA, a court may categorize military retired
benefits as either separate property of the retired member or the
property of the member and his ex-spouse.1"6 The Act additionally
provides that an ex-spouse entitled to a portion of military retire-
ment pay may not sell, assign, or transfer that interest. Furthermore,
the interest may not be devised or inherited by that spouse's devisees
or heirs. 1 7 Thus, with the promulgation of the USFSPA, Congress
recognized the need to retain the Waite prong of the terminable in-
terest rule with respect to military pensions.
To recognize this same need, the California Legislature should
amend section 4800.8 to read:
The Court shall make whatever orders are necessary or appro-
priate to assure that each party receives his or her full commu-
nity property share in any retirement plan whether public or
private, including all survivor benefits, including but not limited
to either of the following:
a) Order the division of any retirement benefits payable
upon or after the death of either party in a manner consistent
with section 4800.8.
b) Order a party to elect a survivor benefit annuity or other
similar election for the benefit of such other party, as specified
by the court, in any case in which a retirement plan provides
for such election.
c) In the event that the nonemployee spouse predeceases
the employee spouse, the interest of the nonemployee spouse in
a deferred employment plan shall terminate.' 8
Furthermore, section 2 of the statute should be amended to read: "It
is the intent of the Legislature to abolish the terminable interest rule
set forth in Benson, in order that retirement benefits shall be divided
in accordance with section 4800.'"'1 9
This amendment, in effect, would eliminate the Benson ineq-
uity. A former nonemployee spouse may claim his or her community
property share in the employee spouse's benefits. Moreover, this
amendment would preclude the predeceasing nonemployee spouse
from devising a portion of the surviving spouse's retirement benefits.
136. Id. § 1408. See Comment, The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
of 1982: Problems Resulting from its Application, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 83, 89 (1985-86).
137. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1982). The Act additionally retains the Benson prong of
the terminable interest rule. Id.
138. See supra text accompanying note 1 for comparison.
139. See supra note 2 for comparison.
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V. CONCLUSION
Section 4800.8 changed community property law in California.
In enacting the statute, the California Legislature abolished the ter-
minable interest rule set forth in Benson and Waite. With section
4800.8's application, a former nonemployee spouse may receive his
or her community share in the retirement benefits of the employee
spouse. Additionally, the interest of the nonemployee spouse extends
to benefits payable after the death of either spouse. However, section
4800.8's application can render inequitable results. These effects can
be mitigated by an amendment to the statute. This amendment
would restrict section 4800.8's application to situations where its em-
ployment is absolutely necessary. If such an amendment were
adopted, section 4800.8 could effectively fulfill the need for which it
was enacted, while mitigating the inequities from its application.
Joanna McKim
